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Abstract 
In the past two decades, international organizations have been designing and promoting 
transnational benchmarks for evaluating the quality of governance. The World Bank and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have been competing in devising 
and legitimizing indices across policy areas. Previous studies have demonstrated how 
international organizations can influence national governments by means of governance 
indices. However, a comparative analysis is still missing of the choices international 
organizations have made in establishing their own indices of good governance. By focusing 
on regulatory reform, this paper attempts to fill this gap. It first sets a framework to compare 
the different types of authority that organizations can pursue through benchmarking. It then 
applies this framework to the specific case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and the World Bank, to examine how they differ in their conceptions of 
and use of policy benchmarking.  
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In the last two decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the World Bank (WB) have attempted to causally link good governance to 
economic growth and social development (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009, 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009). Cross-national research has proven that the quality of 
institutions matters: market-oriented and investor-friendly public policy promotes economic 
growth. In an attempt to have ³WLJKWREMHFWLILHGOLQNV´ (Noordegraaf and Abma 2003: 853) 
between governance and economic performance, both the OECD and the WB have been 
engaged in the design and the evaluation of many comparative measures. 
 Recent surveys have identified approximately 140 measures of the quality of national 
governance (World Bank Institute 2006), as well as 178 composite indices of country 
performance (Bandura 2008). The overall system of governance indices can be explored only 
through guides and inventories (Arndt and Oman 2006: 30). The purposes and functionalities 
of indices have evolved, and an ever-increasing number of them supply the growing market 
for policy benchmarking. For instance, Porter (2012) counted 83 measures dedicated to social 
and environmental policy. While the first generation of good governance indices aims to rank 
countries according to their overall quality of democratic and institutional settings,  and 
attempt to evaluate, for example, political instability, political rights, civil liberties, and 
freedom of information and the press, the second generation is designed to correlate and 
compare national policy processes with economic outcome.i  
 Policy benchmarking usually occurs within transnational networks, primarily of 
international organizations (IOs) (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004, Groenendijk 2011). 
Networks of IO administrators, national policy-makers, independent experts, and consultants 
are concerned with effective and efficient public management and develop a discourse on 
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good governance (Pollitt 2001, 2002). Cross-sectional time-series analyses of policy 
performance have become central in the discourse around the modernization of public 
administration and evidence-based decision-making (Erkkilä and Piironen 2010, Pal 2012). 
By setting global standards of policy evaluation (Davis et al. 2012), IOs are nodal points 
capable of framing and promoting policy reforms (Sahlin-Andersson 2001, Sahlin-Andersson 
and Engwall 2002, Pal 2003, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Ultimately, data sets provide 
benchmarks, rankings and comparative knowledge and increase the interdependence of 
governments within transnational networks through both learning and competition.  
 Although several scholars have agreed on the role played by the OECD and the WB 
in diffusing new policy ideas and best practices (Stone 2003, Marcussen 2004, Orenstein 
2008, Mahon and McBride 2009, Pal 2012), a comparative analysis of their employment of 
policy benchmarks is still lacking. As devices of transnational governance (Martens and 
Jakobi 2010, Porter 2012, Davis et al. 2012), indices are a source of the authority for the 
OECD and the WB as agenda-setters (Ougaard 2010) and transfer agents (Stone 2004). In 
order to promote policy reforms and to accomplish their missions,ii the OECD and the WB 
use indices to influence national governments and to communicate with donors, investors, 
and the general public. However, this paper argues that the two transfer agents have different 
motivations, produce different types of knowledge (Kramarz and Momani 2013), and, 
consequently, rely on indicators with different characteristics.  
 The aim of this paper is to examine different modes of influence IOs seek to exert 
through the use of benchmarking. This descriptive analysis answers the following question: 
in what manner have the OECD and the WB chosen to produce their knowledge and to 
establish their authority? Because knowledge authority is a necessary condition for domestic 
policy change (Conzelmann 2010), by answering this question we can hypothesize about the 
role of IOs in the transnational policy process (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 1999, Davis et al. 
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2012). To clarify, this ³descriptive argument´ (Gerring 2012) is not about the actual influence 
and impact of indicators on domestic policy (see Pal 2012, Chapter 6, Alasuutari and 
Rasimus, 2009, Gibbs and Luczak 2010 for examples of such an analysis). Instead, it derives 
functional typologies of governance benchmarks.    
 The choices of the OECD and the WB are analyzed through four case studies of 
indices of regulatory quality (two from each organization). These indices unify political 
economy recommendations for liberalization and the institutionalist turn of the OECD and 
the WB. Given the high level of competition between these suppliers of regulatory reform, 
one can expect distinctness in benchmarking.   
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on the technical, conceptual, and political uses of governance indicators. Section 3 
puts forward an analytical framework in which the WB and the OECD are set as transfer 
agents in search of knowledge authority through their benchmarking activities. Section 4 
presents a comparative analysis of the four indices of regulatory quality, and Section 5 
concludes.  
Governance Indices and the Role of International Organizations 
 There is a fast-growing literature on the composite indices that are used to measure 
country performance. Following Van Dooren (2009), this literature can be reviewed 
according to the technical, the conceptual, and the politico-administrative research agenda.  
 First, several scholars have focused on the technical and methodological elements of 
indices of institutional quality (Arndt and Oman 2006, Knoll and Zloczysti 2011) as well as 
of the benchmarks used in various policy sectors, such as regulatory reform (Radaelli and De 
Francesco 2007), health services (Pollitt 2011a), education (Pollitt 2011b), and environmental 
protection (Etsy and Porter 2005, Etsy et al. 2008). This technical discussion revolves around 
recurring issues of selection bias in data collection, the weighting and aggregation of the 
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data, as well as the transparency and replicability of the methodology (Arndt and Oman 
2006, Arndt 2008, Pollitt 2011a).  
 Second, the concepts to be measured through the use of indices are often contested 
(van de Walle 2006, 2008, 2009). Governance, for instance, is an all-embracing (Knoll and 
Zloczysti 2011: 2) and technocratic (Hirst 2000) concept associated with particular 
characteristics of democratic regimes, such as the rule of law, accountability, the separation 
of powers, the existence of checks and balances on the executive, and citizeQV¶GHOLEHUDWLRQ
and participation. Governance can be associated with either specific state functions or 
informal institutions (Knoll and Zloczysti 2011: 2). Furthermore, it can capture the 
transformation of state±citizens relationships. Governance can be also a normative concept 
meant to measure and promote standards of democracy and state effectiveness (Knoll and 
Zloczysti 2011: 2), although the underlying normative notion does not often rely on 
theoretical foundations (Arndt and Oman 2006), as Arndt (2008) discusses specifically in 
relation to the WB¶V ³World Governance Indicators´ (WGI).  
 Scholars interested in the political influence of indices have assessed their impact on 
domestic policy by relying on either a rationalist or a constructivist approach. Rationalist 
scholars argue that IOs use transnational policy benchmarks for hegemonic purposes (Bonal 
2002, Rubenson 2008). For instance, the WB provides loans according to governance 
indices. On the contrary, social constructivist scholars argue that benchmarks are learning 
tools. Regular discussions and evaluations of policy outcome lead to the development of ³D
common value system at the level of civil servants in the OECD countries that should form 
the basis for consensually shared definitions of problems and solutions in economic 
SROLF\PDNLQJ´Marcussen 2004: 15). Knowledge provides routines that define and form 
(beyond the conscious level) what is deemed appropriate behavior by member states. 
Mechanisms of peer review and pressure to conform have an identity-shaping function. 
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Socialization and identity formation are at the heart of the OECD mechanism of governance 
(OECD 2004: 4, Porter and Webb 2008).  
 By transcending the debate between rationalist and constructivist scholarship, several 
studies have focused on the functional features of governance indices. As technological 
devices of power and governance at a distance (Noordegraaf and Abma 2003: 856; Davies et 
al. 2012), indices activate a myriad of communicative relations and connect a dispersed set of 
actors and objects (Porter 2012)XUWKHUPRUHWKH\KDYH³WKHSRWHQWLDOWRDOWHUWKHIRUPVWKH
exercise, and perhaps even the distributions of power in certain spheres of global 
JRYHUQDQFH´'DYLVHWDO 
 Policy benchmarks have been assessed through their functional features. Groenendijk 
(2011), for example, has compared the (XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶Vopen method of coordination with 
the OECD benchmarking system. Although both are voluntary, cooperative, and open to the 
particular needs of each member state, he concluded that the OECD¶VV\VWHP is more 
effective in enhancing policy learning than the (XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VPHWKRG. By taking into 
account the attractiveness, unintended consequences, and methodological transparency of the 
measurement of national policy performance, Pollitt (2011a, 2011b) has argued that the 
prominence of governance indices is a symptom of the rise of hypermodernist conception of 
government. Porter (2012) has relied on actor network theory to emphasize the consequences 
of the knowledge produced through governance indices and the OECD peer review 
mechanism. Peer review is less open to contestation and is more capable of connecting 
transnational actors than are rankings. Davis, Kingsbury and Merry (2012) have compared 
the WB Doing Business Indicators with the Human Development Index, by taking into 
account their design, production, effects, contestation, and regulation.  
 This focus on functionality allows us to compare the authority of the OECD and the 
WB, in that ³Peasurement functions as a source of authority´(Noordegraaf and Abma 2003: 
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856). In this light, the authority of such transnational evaluators coincides with the 
functionality of their indicators (Mahon and McBride 2009, Davis et al. 2012, Kramarz and 
Momani 2013). Transnational policy evaluators provide comparative knowledge that national 
policy-makers are not able to produce (Conzelmann 2010). Benchmarks set standards for 
monitoring, auditing, DQGUDQNLQJFRXQWULHV¶SROLF\performance (Davies et al. 2012). And the 
OECD and the WB promote political and economic reforms that adhere to their evaluative 
standards. Provided that the scope, procedure, and methodology of policy benchmarking are 
perceived by member states as appropriate and legitimate (Cronin and Hurd 2008: 12, 
Conzelmann 2010), gRYHUQDQFHLQGLFHVDUHLQVWUXPHQWVIRU³QDPLQJDQGVKDPLQJ´³KRUVH
UDFHV´%HQQHU5HLQLFNHDQG:LWWHDQG³DLG-DOORFDWLRQFRQGLWLRQDOLW\´$UQGW
Knoll and Zloczysti 2011). As a result, the authority of their benchmarking systems allows 
the OECD to act as a transfer agent (Stone 2004), and the WB to perform as a knowledge 
bank (Stone 2003, Kramarz and Momani 2013).   
 Several single-case studies and matched comparisons of governance indices have 
identified the elements of governance indices (Conzelmman, 2010, Pollitt 2011a, Pollitt 
2011b, Groenendijk 2011, Davis et al. 2012, Kramarz and Momani 2013). However, there is 
still the need for a coherent analytical approach in order to avoid the risk of overlooking 
important politico-administrative and technical aspects of benchmarking. The next section 
proposes a framework to distinguish modes of benchmarking and to associate them with 
different mechanisms of policy interdependence. The framework allows us to assess the 
variation in the design and use of regulatory governance indicators. 
Transfer Agents, Knowledge Management, and the Features of 
Benchmarking  
IOs develop common solutions and policy responses for their members. As transfer agents, 
the OECD and the WB produce and disseminate knowledge (Stone 2003, 2004). They are 
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³LGHDWLRQDODJHQFLHV´ZKLFKWUDQVIRUPDQGGHSROLWLFL]H international best practices 
(Marcussen 2004, Groenendijk 2011, author 2013). To do so, the OECD and the WB 
conceive, design, and market prototype instruments for policy benchmarking.  
 In such a contested environment, expertise in the design of benchmarking indicators 
is prominent (Davis et al. 2012: 87). The development of indicators resembles the production 
of scientific knowledge. An indicator builds on theoretical concepts, here principally 
statistical properties, as well as on networks of experts. Transnational networks of expertise 
determine the authority invested in any particular set of indicators, and that in turn is shaped 
not only by technical factors, but also by relational interactions among the actors involved in 
policy benchmarking (Davis et al. 2012: 88). An analysis of such relationships reveals that 
benchmarking encompasses two opposing concepts: benchmarking as competition and 
benchmarking as collaboration (Wolfram Cox, Mann and Samson 1997). Benchmarking is 
³conceived as a measure to assist the gaining of superiority over other/s´7KHDLPRI
benchPDUNLQJLV³OHDUQLQJZLWKRWKHUVUDWKHUWKDQJDLQLQJSRVLWLRQRYHUWKHP´and ³>W@KH
dominant relationship is joint collaboration.´ It follows that the features of benchmarking 
indicators that may be used to characterize them result from ³the nature of benchmarking 
SURMHFWV´(Wolfram Cox, Mann and Samson 1997: 291).  
 Table 1 summarizes the analytical framework that encompasses models of knowledge 
development and benchmarking concepts, as well as the methodological and technical 
features of governance indices. These alternative types of policy benchmarking are useful to 
assess the degree of competitive benchmarking compared with collaborative benchmarking 
(Wolfram Cox, Mann and Samson 1997: 304). These ideal types of benchmarking are the 
extremes on the competition±collaboration continuum, ³where a middle point indicates 
QHLWKHUDVWURQJFROODERUDWLRQQRUVWURQJFRPSHWLWLRQ´Wolfram Cox, Mann and Samson 
1997: 304). In addition, the ideal types capture the different modes of influence IOs achieve 
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by means of benchmarking, combining in a unitary framework both rationalist and 
constructivist approaches. This framework provides an extremely useful dimension for 
categorizing the entire universe of governance indices. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 Following Kramaz and Momani (2013), the literature on knowledge management 
provides two analytical distinctions. Knowledge can be regarded as generic, to produce 
comparative knowledge of country policy performance, or functional, to produce learning 
(Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002, Groenendijk 2011). As a product, knowledge can be codified 
and stored. IOs that are engaged in delivering a commercial product need information 
technology and operational processes to make the transfer of best practices more effective. 
By creating thematic groups and communities of practice, knowledge can be also produced in 
contextual and dynamic ways through relational interactions (Kramaz and Momani 2013: 
41,QRWKHUZRUGV³>Q@HWZRUNVDUHDOVRWKHPHDQVE\ZKLFKRUJDQL]DWLRQVLQGLYLGXDOO\DQG
in coalition project their personnel and ideas into policy developments across states and 
within global and regional forums. Through networks, participants can build alliances, 
GHYHORSDFRPPRQODQJXDJHDQGFRQVWUXFWVKDUHGNQRZOHGJH´6WRQH.  
 Turning to the type of transfer agency, and at the cost of oversimplification, an IO that 
privileges knowledge as a product is similar to a consultancy that follows a rigorous 
methodology for collecting, analyzing, and feeding back objective data. Such organizations 
establish their authority through their roles as advisors, experts, or solution providers 
(Caldwell 2003: 137, Kramarz and Momani 2013: 417).   In contrast, a learning organization 
combines inside knowledge and external expertise. Learning is a collective process in which 
network members work collaboratively and constantly renew and improve their 
organizational activities (Caldwell 2003: 138±139).  
 Policy benchmarking can be internal or external (Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002, 
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Groenendijk 2011). Benchmarking is a standard-driven process, external to national 
governments. IOs compare countries by relying on their own information and knowledge 
resources. Furthermore, this type of benchmarking tends to spur competition among 
countries, with ³ULYDOHQWLWLHV´being ranked according to policy results. Rank-ordered 
structure is a technical property of indicators and refers to scaling methods such as ordinal 
scale, equal-interval scale or ratio scale (Davis et al. 2012: 76).  Thus, governance 
benchmarks are broad, encompassing numerous concepts and issues (Pollitt 20011b). They 
rank countries of the world according to policy outcome, through the use of composite 
indices (Groenendijk 2011).  
 In contrast, by relying on shared evaluation standards, internal benchmarking is 
collaborative and involves a joint effort from IOs and their member states. In essence, it is 
DERXW³OHDUQLQJIURPRWKHUV´DQGit tends to measure policy process. Furthermore, peer 
review is functional to learning and involves benchmarks of the specific context of a limited 
number of members of the learning organization (Groenendijk 2011). 
 The technical property of governance indices is consistent with the type of 
measurement procedure (Conzelmann 2010). Indices can be classified according to the 
objectivity of data sources and the weighting of governance benchmarks (Radaelli and De 
Francesco 2007). The literature on policy evaluation and measurement distinguishes between 
two broad purposes of indicators. Indicators can be used either for verification or for 
evaluation (Roche 1999: 48-9). Accordingly, indicators for competitive benchmarking are 
specific and relate to DµGHILQLWLYH¶EHVWSUDFWLFH. These indicators must be defined precisely 
and their interpretation is unambiguous. Further, it must be possible to collect the relevant 
data within a reasonable time and at reasonable cost. For all these properties, transfer agents 
that aim to trigger competition are expected to use benchmarking indicators (Table 1, col. 1).  
In contrast, benchmarking indicators (Table 1, col. 2) can be associated with transfer agents 
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that consider benchmarking as an empowering and learning process. The emphasis is given 
to informants and affected stakeholders. Peer review indicators are more contextualized: a 
number of indicators are chosen from a range and are left disaggregated. Their validity needs 
to be cross-checked by using different information sources and methodologies.  
 The last feature considered in the table is a benchmark¶Vcapacity to reduce the 
complex nature of reality (Van Dooren 2010: 2, Arndt and Oman 2006; Arndt 2008). 
Theorization is an institutional condition of diffusion: ³*HQHUDOPRGHOVIDFLOLWDWHPHDQLQJIXO
communication and influence and influence between weakly related actors, and between 
WKHRULVWVDQGDGRSWHUV´6WUDQJDQG0H\HU493). Accordingly, one can expect 
benchmarking based on theoretical insights to have a strong influence on the agenda of 
scientists and the mass media. The proposition is that ranking with strong theorization allows 
IOs to have direct communication with the general public, for instance through   publications. 
Comparing Transnational Regulatory Benchmarks 
 Measurement has been applied in many areas of public policy, such as budget, 
education, health, and social policy, as well as administrative accountability and transparency 
(Drori 2006: 91). Regulatory governance requires dedicated institutions and has as its core 
elements economic efficiency, accountability, and legitimacy. Regulatory quality is now 
perceived as a necessary condition for economic development and has become a key priority 
for both the OECD and the WB. Their transnational networks evaluate countries according to 
the quality of rulemaking process and the effectiveness of the regulatory environment (World 
Bank 2002, OECD Regulatory Policy Committee 2009, OECD 2011). Specifically, the WB 
KDVGHYHORSHGWZRFRPSRVLWHPHDVXUHVWKH³5HJXODWRU\4XDOLW\´54DVXE-index of the 
WGIDQGWKH³'RLQJ%XVLQHVV´ indicator (DB), to grade governments according to the 
extent of their regulatory environment.  In contrast, the OECD relies on more policy-oriented 
measures and checklists.  
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 Ranking Countries: Regulatory Reform Measured by the WB 
 The WB has developed several sets of governance indices. The most widely 
recognized index is the DB. Since 2003 and through a series of annual reports, the DB 
project ranks countries according to the intrusiveness of various sorts of regulations on 
business activities (Davis and Kruse 2007: 1097). Regulation is measured throughout the life 
F\FOHRIDORFDOEXVLQHVV7KH'%SURMHFWLVSDUWRIWKH:%¶VJHQHUDOHIIRUWVWRHQKDQFHthe 
productivity of the private sector and in turn reduce poverty. It has the following four 
functions:  
x the rDQNLQJDQGPHDQLQJIXOFRPSDULVRQVRIFRXQWULHV¶UHJXODWRU\HQYLURQPHQWV
are used to trigger public demands for deregulation;  
x policy-oriented indicators and the theoretical relationship between indicators and 
economic performance help to identify the reforms required in any particular country;  
x the rankings are used in the allocation of aid and in monitoring use of the :%¶V
development grants; and 
x the time-series cross-sectional data produced with the DB are used to test theories of 
regulatory capture and barriers to market entry. 
 The data set is popular for ranking countries according to the number of procedures 
typically encountered by a firm, and the cost and time taken to complete them,  in carrying 
out activities such as starting a business, getting credit, protecting investment, or paying 
taxes. The number of procedures, time, and cost approximate the strictness of the regulation. 
Regulation is assumed to be introduced QRWWRVDIHJXDUGFRQVXPHUV¶FKRLFHVEXWWR protect 
policy-PDNHUV¶UHQW-seeking activities. In other words, DB indicators assume that regulation 
has a significant and negative relationship with economic development (Davis and Kruse, 
2007). The DB data set enables policy-makers, citizens, donors, and investors to score and 
monitor the regulatory environment. Its overall purpose is to provide information on a given 
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FRXQWU\¶VDQQXDOSURJUHVVtowards regulatory reform.  
 Turning to the methodology, there are five steps in the data collection:  
x direct analysis of the content of regulations on each specific business activity;iii  
x surveys of local experts;  
x discussion of any data differences between the direct analysis ad the survey;  
x refinement of the questionnaire and further data collection; and  
x enhancement of data robustness. 
 What is striking about this data-gathering methodology is the absence of government 
participation, in order to derive objective data. Furthermore, the aggregation of sub-indicators 
in the overall composite measure for ranking countries is simple and straightforward. These 
insights into methodology, data collection, and aggregation allow us to conclude that, 
between the two types of indicators, DB benchmarking is close to the competitive type of 
benchmarking. The overall aim of the project is to encourage governments around the world 
WRGHUHJXODWH5HPDUNVVXFKDV³KHDYLHUUHJXODWLRQRIEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHVJHQHUDOO\EULQJVEDG
RXWFRPHV´³SD\RIIVIURPUHIRUPDSSHDUODUJH´RU³PDQ\WLPHVZKDWZRUNVLQGHYHORSHG
countries works well in developing countries too, defying the often-used saying µone size 
GRHVQ¶WILWDOO,¶´ allow us to maintain that the WB is acting as a consultant change agency. 
7KLVLVFRQILUPHGE\WKHIDFWWKDW³WKH'%UHSRUWVGHYRWHDJUHDWGHDORIVSDFHWRDQHFGRWHV
about various reform initiatives and conclusions about the specific reforms that are associated 
ZLWKJRRGRXWFRPH´'DYLVDQG.UXVH7KH:%¶VSXUVXLWRIderegulation makes 
the DB data set controversial, and, consequently, many scholars and governments (Davis and 
Kruse 2007, Davis et al. 2012), and even the WB itself (World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2008), have disputed its theoretical foundations and data collection methodology. This 
contestation has resulted in a more careful use of the DB ranking. Although appreciating the 
DB product for its simplicity and the high degree of influence, the World Bank IEG 
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Independent Evaluation Group recommended caution in the use of the ranking, and stated 
that it should be complemented by other country-specific information, in order to 
contextualize the theoretical assumptions underpinning this regulatory benchmark.  
 Overall, the WB challenges countries to follow the deregulatory model.iv The BD 
ranking is obviously not cooperative, but triggers competition among countries to deregulate 
their business and commercial law, since comparative data on the extent of regulation is 
available worldwide. The DB reports published by the WB explicitly invites donors of 
foreign aid, high-level government officials, investors, the media, and the general public to 
use these indicators as benchmarks against which to assess the performance of various 
countries and to establish a basis for demands for reform (Davis and Kruse 2007, World 
Bank 2004: ix±x).  
 Similarly to the DB indicators, the WGI are publicly available on the web and widely 
used to compare the quality of governance from 1996 to today and across more than 200 
countries.v As a result, they are well known among academics and media. The data sources 
are more than 30 subjective and perceptional measures of institutional quality, drawn from 
expert assessments and surveys of large firm. They do not emerge from, or imply, a theory of 
governance, but broadly refer to traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised in 
a country (Arndt and Oman 2006, Andrews 2008). The complex concept of governance is 
decomposed through six different dimensions: voice and accountability, policy stability, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality. A 
composite indicator measures each dimension. RQ focuses on the policy output and  
³LQFOXGHVPHDVXUHVRIWKHLQFLGHQFHRIPDUNHW-unfriendly policies such as price control or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perception of the burdens imposed by excessive 
UHJXODWLRQLQDUHDVVXFKDVIRUHLJQWUDGHDQGEXVLQHVVGHYHORSPHQW´.DXIPDQQ.UDD\DQG
Mastruzzi 2004: 255).vi  
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 The selection among the existing indicators and the techniques of aggregation are 
both subjective and controversial (Arndt and Oman 2006, Andrews 2008). The aggregation 
starts with the calculation of a simple, unweighted average of all the existing indicators of a 
single source. But in the later stages of aggregation  a weight is attributed to each selected 
indicator according to the strength of its correlations with other indicators (Arndt and Oman 
2006). The positive feature of this governance benchmarking system is that it makes explicit 
and takes into account the substantial margins of error in subjective data sources. However, 
the same margin of error²Kaufmann and associates (2003) argue²exists in objective 
measures as well when they are used to portray broader concepts, such as regulatory quality 
or the efficiency of governance.  
 Similarly to the DB indicators, the RQ does not rely on government sources. But data 
sources are in this case perceptions-based, and ³LQFOXGHsurveys of firms and households, as 
well as the subjective assessments of a variety of commercial business information providers, 
non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral organizations and other 
public-sector bodies´.DXIPDQQHWDO. Benchmarking has a competitive purpose 
and, in this case again, the ambition of the WB is to urge governments to pursue 
deregulation. The great difference between the two WB benchmarking systems is what they 
measure. The RQ is clearly a broad index that refers to the overall RXWFRPHRIDFRXQWU\¶V 
regulatory policy. RQ is not policy-oriented as the DB. Furthermore, it is not based on any 
specific theory of regulation or governance (Arndt and Oman 2006, Andrews 2008).  
Peer Review: Regulatory Reform Measured by the OECD 
 Since the 1990s, the OECD has been active in promoting reforms concerning 
regulatory quality. In 1991, its Working Party on Regulatory Management and Reform was 
established, and a few years later the ³5HFRPPHQGDWLRQRIWKH&RXQFLORQ,PSURYLQJWKH
4XDOLW\RI*RYHUQPHQW5HJXODWLRQ´ZDVDGRSWHG7KHWorking Party was later replaced by 
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the more operational Group on Regulatory Policy,vii which KDVXSGDWHGWKH³UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ
RQUHJXODWRU\SROLF\DQGJRYHUQDQFH´ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKHWHPSODWHIRUSHHUUHYLHZLQJ 
government capacity to assure high-quality regulation.  
 'LIIHUHQWO\IURPWKH:%³>W@KH2(&'RSHUDWHVZLWKDVSHFLDOPL[RIUHVHarch and 
FRXQWU\SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´3DO0HPEHUVWDWHVDJUHHRQWKH2(&'¶VUHVHDUFKDJHQGD
and are involved in the peer review, commenting on country reports before publication. The 
2(&'¶VSHFXOLDULW\LVWKDWLWFDQGUDZRQWKHZLOOLQJVXSSRUWRILWs members (and other 
VWDWHVWRSURYLGH³LQVLGH´LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWZKDWJRYHUQPHQWVDUHGRLQJLQVSHFLILFILHOGV
The participation of governments is a constant in all key activities and governance 
mechanisms of the OECD. In particular, the OECD influences its members through: seminars 
and workshops, peer-to-peer visits by government delegations, and best practice; didactic 
country reports that make evaluations against global standards (for example the 2005 report 
on China argued for major reforms in public and corporate governance); networks of national 
officials on specific policy issues (for example the network of Senior Budget Officials); 
guidelines on the adoption of policy reforms and innovations (for example the guidelines on 
Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service); checklists and frameworks for policy-
makers (for example Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment); and surveys of 
governments on their practices.  
 Overall, the OECD peer review process is:  
the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by 
other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its 
policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards 
and principles. The examination is conducted on a non-adversarial basis, and 
it relies heavily on mutual trust among the states involved in the review, as 
well as their shared confidence in the process. (Pagani 2002: 4, emphasis 
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added) 
 In other words, peer review is an instrument with which to collect information on 
PHPEHUV¶SROLF\SHUIRUPDQFHDQGWRevaluate this information in the light of shared 
standards, norms, and principles (Conzelmann 2010: 1). It is a mechanism of accountability 
in public policy networks (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004). It is also an informal 
instrument of pressure through which ideas and standards advocated by a majority of 
member states gain agreement (Sullivan 1997: 99). Comparative statistics and best practices 
QRWRQO\SURGXFH³DFRQVWDQWHQWLFHPHQWWRHQFRXUDJHµODJJDUGV¶WRFDWFKXSWRµOHDGHUV¶´3DO
2009: 12), but also structure multilateral surveillance in the implementation of policies 
(Marcussen 2004). The most relevant aspect of this process of networked governance is the 
production of mutual education. In a QXWVKHOOWKH2(&'¶VDPELWLRQLV³WRKDUGZLUH
indicators into an ongoing global conversation among practitioners about good governance, 
in order to facilitate lesson-GUDZLQJPHFKDQLVPV´3DO 
 There are two modes of measurement used by the OECD for assessing regulatory 
reform: Indicators of Product Market Regulation (IPMR) and Indicators of Regulatory 
Management Systems (IRMS). Both systems are compilations of best practices and rely on 
information gathered by the OECD through national high-level civil servant surveys; neither, 
though, is based on strong theoretical foundations. However, they differ in several respects. 
7KH,305V\VWHPLVDFRPSLODWLRQRIPHDVXUHVRI³WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSROLF\VHWWLQJV
promote or inhibit competition in areas of WKHSURGXFWPDUNHWZKHUHFRPSHWLWLRQLVYLDEOH´ 
Although inserted in a broader OECD peer review system (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 
2005: 4), the IPMR system has several aspects of indicators facilitating competition: it is a 
composite indicator, and its aggregation relies on a ³UDQGRPZHLJKWV´WHFKQLTXHDQG
sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, the IPMR system is objective in the sense that the high-
OHYHOFLYLOVHUYDQWV¶TXHVWLRQQDLUHDVNVIRUIDFWXDOLQIRUPDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQ their perceptions of 
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regulatory quality. The IPMR system refers to specific aspects of the extent of regulatory 
intervention. Yet, the IPMR rely on periodic surveys of the national administrations (Conway, 
Janod and Nicoletti 2005: 3). There is, thus, still a strong element of collaboration.  
 IRMS, instead, are drawn from a checklist EDVHGRQWKH2(&'¶Vrecommendations on 
regulatory reform and governance. These recommendations in turn shape the peer review of 
government capacity to assure high-quality regulation. This benchmark aims to reveal trends 
across countries (OECD Regulatory Policy Committee 2009: 6). Rather than focusing on the 
extent of regulation, IRMS measure the quality of regulatory institutions and tools such as: 
regulatory oversight bodies; reductions in administrative burden; effective consultation and 
public participation; cost±benefit analysis and impact assessment; and indicators of 
regulatory performance and outcomes. The measurement is conducted on the process for 
making and revising regulations. IRMS are a powerful means of communicating reforms to 
policy-makers. They highlight priority areas for further action, demonstrate consistency 
between recommended action and positive outcomes, enhance the legitimacy and 
accountability of regulatory reform, and raise awareness of regulatory quality (OECD 
Regulatory Policy Committee 2009: 10). This type of indicator facilitates learning. The 
aggregation occurs only at the meso-level, of regulatory institutions. The system is 
participatory. Governments agree on a set of recommendations and checklists and actively 
participate in the collection and interpretation of data, information, and knowledge on 
regulatory quality. Overall, IRMS aim to empower governments to proceed in their efforts on 
regulatory reform.  
Comparing Choices for Benchmarking 
 While the previous section reviewed the different types of indices, this section 
comparatively assesses the choices the OECD and the WB have made for the promotion of 
their own indices in an increasingly competitive market of transnational policy benchmarks. 
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The WB generally provides knowledge as a product. Its indices are well known by 
international investors and donors. Furthermore, the WB uses a type of benchmarking, 
namely ranking, that triggers regulatory competition among countries. As a consequence, its 
communication strategy is extensive and addresses not exclusively national governments but 
also the scientific community (Kramarz and Momani 2013), as well as the general public  
(that is, the mass media and citizens) (Davis et al. 2012: 93). The WB expends enormous 
effort in publishing annual reports that include both indicators (DB and RQ) in order to create 
easily accessible data sets. This visibility has been appreciated by academics, who have 
helped to improve the methodology for collecting and aggregating information (Arndt and 
Oman 2006, Andrews 2008, Davis and Kruse 2007, Davis et al. 2012).viii  
 It is important to note that the DB project promotes best practice by relying on the 
theoretical assumption that less regulation facilitates better business outcomes and triggers 
economic growth. Furthermore, the DB project triggers more competition than the RQ 
indicator. The former is more objective with respect to the selection and aggregation of data 
as well as being policy-oriented, specific, and relevant for policy-makers.  
 Turning to the OECD, this organization has sought to manage its knowledge as a 
process and to promote its policy recommendations and international best practice through 
learning. Its main aim is to promote comparative knowledge and to share experience of 
regulatory reform among its member states. The peer-review process is mainly internal to the 
learning organization. Both the data sources and the reviewers are governmental. In 
comparison with the WB, the OECD attracts less attention from scientists (Kramarz and 
Momani 2013). Although several research papers are available (Conway et al 2005, OECD 
Regulatory Policy Committee 2009, OECD 2011), no books have been published by the 
OECD on the results of its two regulatory benchmarks. Turning to the typologies of indices 
created by the OECD, the focus is mainly on qualitative measures of the national regulatory 
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institutions and rulemaking process. There is no attempt to prove any theory or to correlate 
reform efforts with economic growth and performance. Overall, IPMR generate less learning, 
since no specific model is attached to the proposed reform. Instead, the IRMS is based on 
well-established recommendations and guidelines for reform. These are a blueprint for 
sharing information on regulatory reform and learning from the experience of other 
governments.  
Conclusion 
By focusing on regulatory governance, this paper has argued that different types of 
transnational benchmarking are used by the OECD and the WB. Some governance indices 
trigger competition. Others facilitate learning. In designing regulatory governance indices the 
OECD and the WB have made different choices for establishing the authority of their own 
benchmarks. Similarly to the work of Wolfram Cox et al. (1997) on the benchmarking of the 
private sector, an analytical framework of policy benchmarking has been proposed to capture 
the interrelationships between IOs and national governments. Any effort to classify 
governance indices should take into account the competition/collaboration typology of 
benchmarking.  
 By conceiving indicators as a technology of transnational governance, the framework 
enables us to bring together two contrasting perspectives on the influence IOs achieve 
through their benchmarking: the hegemonic use of rankings, and the ideational role of 
multilateral surveillance and peer review. The framework allows an assessment to be made of 
the degree of competition triggered by governance ranking compared with the collaborative 
practices of peer review. Furthermore, models of the transfer agent and the features of 
benchmarking refer to modes of transnational governance. The OECD creates comparative 
knowledge and promotes learning of international best practices through networks of policy-
makers and experts. The WB aims instead to promote regulatory reform by widely 
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communicating the outcome of its ranking activities to international investors and donors, as 
well as the public, through the mass media.  
 The competition±collaboration continuum has captured variation across indices 
conceived by the same IO as well as different IOs. The framework also captures the authority 
of IOs as policy evaluators. Both the IOs considered here are marginally converging to the 
middle point. The WB is reconsidering the use of the DB rank, and indeed the contribution of 
other data sources is now necessary in order to contextualize the assessment of regulatory 
quality in that model. In other words, the WB has recognized the need ³WRfoster a 
FROODERUDWLYHFXOWXUHLQWHJUDWLQJPXOWLSOHSHUVSHFWLYHVLQWRWKH%DQN¶VZRUNHVSHFLDOO\IURP
developing countries, and promoting knowledge VKDULQJDQGOHDUQLQJ´:RUOG%DQNY. 
Turning to the OECD, this organization is extending the geographical scope of its 
transnational governance model. Since 2010 Chile and Israel have become new members; 
and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia aQG6RXWK$IULFDDUHQRZ³NH\SDUWQHUV.´ In 
addition, the OECD has become increasingly sophisticated in the statistical use of data 
collected through peer review, in order to discover general patterns of regulatory reform and 
clusters of countries (Wölfl et al. 2009, Jacobzone et al. 2010).  
Overall, this descriptive analysis contributes to the conceptualization of transnational 
governance by highlighting the functions and the technical elements of policy benchmarking. 
As a result, this contribution facilitates future research on the impact of transnational 
benchmarks on national policy. Further research could use the proposed analytical framework 
in a study of other policy benchmarks. The proposition that ranking attracts more public 
attention than peer review could be tested quantitatively and qualitatively through analyses 
based on reports in international financial newspapers. 
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i
 Here I take a different perspective to the one taken by Knack, Kugler, and Manning (2003), who depicted the 
evolution of governance indices in terms of the legitimization of the methodology and the credibility of the 
data collected. 
ii
 Article 1 of the OECD Convention states that the mission of the OECD is to promote among its members 
economic and trade expansion policies. The WB has a similar mission: to collect, disseminate, and share 
knowledge (Kramarz and Momani 2013: 409). 
iii
 The data set now contains 10 firm activities: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting 
electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. It is important to note that the sub-LQGH[RI³HPSOR\LQJ
ZRUNHUV´KDVEHHQH[FOXGHGIURPWKHODVWWZRSXEOLFDWLRQV7KHUHLVDQRQJRLQJGLVFXVVLRQRQWKHPRVW
appropriate methodology to find the right balance between regulatory flexibility, enough to help those 
currently unemployed or working in the informal sector to obtain new jobs in the formal sector, and 
regulatory protection for those already holding a job, so that their productivity is not stifled. It is interesting 
WRQRWHWKDWWKH:%IDFHVGLIILFXOWLHVZKHQWKH³OHVVLVPRUH´PD[LPFDQQRWEHWKHRUHWLFDOO\DSSOLHGWRWKH
regulatory sector. 
iv
 7KLVLVFOHDUO\HPSKDVL]HGLQVHYHUDOLWDOLFL]HGKHDGLQJVVXFKDV³6LPSOLI\DQGGHUHJXODWHLQFRPSHWLWLYH
PDUNHWV´ RU³5HGXFHFRXUWLQYROYHPHQWLQEXVLQHVVPDWWHUV´:RUOG%DQN-4). 
v
 ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWWKH:*,GHGLFDWHGZHEVLWHVWDWHVWKDW³>7@KH:*,DUHQRWXVHGE\WKH:RUOG%DQN
*URXSWRDOORFDWHUHVRXUFHV´http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home , accessed on  5 
December 2013. 
vi
 RQ variables are aggregated LQWRDQRYHUDOOLQGH[WKDWYDULHVEHWZHHQDQG³7KH space above zero 
RVWHQVLEO\FRQWDLQVHIIHFWLYHJRYHUQPHQWVDQGWKHVSDFHEHORZ]HURVKRZVLQHIIHFWLYHJRYHUQPHQWV´
(Andrews 2008: 383). As a consequence, this equal-interval rank is effective in separating out good and bad 
performers. High scores mean better governance outcomes. Variations of the index show how countries 
change their relative position over time. 
vii
 This Group recently became a standalone and independent committee within the Directorate for Public 
Governance and Territorial Development. 
viii
 Kaufmman et al. (2007) drafted a paper to answer to the criticism of their indicators. 
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Table 1: Types of transnational policy benchmarking, knowledge authority, as well as 
methodological and technical properties of governance indices. Based on Wolfram Cox et al. 
(1997: 291) 
  
 Types of benchmarking 
Feature of  
benchmarking 
Competitive benchmarking Collaborative benchmarking 
Influence of IOs and  
mechanism of transfer 
Competition Learning 
Knowledge management Knowledge as a product Knowledge as a process 
Type of transfer agents Consultant Learning organization 
Breadth of issue Large Narrow 
Geographical scope Worldwide Regional 
Benchmarking process Externally conceived 
standard 
Top-down 
Ranking 
Internally agreed standard 
 
Bottom-up 
Peer review based on checklists 
Indices   
Purpose Verification Evaluation 
Type Composite Set of single measures  
Application Generic Contextual 
   
Mode of aggregation Objective Subjective 
Focus Policy outcome Policy process 
Theorization High  Low and indirect communication 
with the general public 
Communication with the 
general public 
High and direct  Low and mediate 
 
